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Abstract 
 I argue that the extended simples picture (ESP) is compatible with 
supersubstantivalism under the quantum holism model, and that reevaluating our limits on the 
ways an object may be located by fusing the two ontologies can benefit our understanding of 
modern physics. I first illustrate the explanatory utility of extended simples, using examples 
of superposition and entanglement. Second, I advocate the use of supersubstantivalism as a 
way to understand the interface between objects and spacetime, and argue that the ESP 
suitably fits into a supersubstantivalist interpretation of quantum field theory. In the last 
section, I propose quantum holism as a framework to reconcile supersubstantivalism with 
extended simples, and conclude that the causal relationship that interweaves material objects 
and spacetime render the two ontologies compatible. I will demonstrate that a combined 
ontology is useful for its parsimony, and for our understanding of quantum field theory. 
 
1. Ways an object may be located: Extended Simples 
 Moving away from the assumption that simples must be physically small, or that all 
extended objects consist of multiple, spatially disparate parts, metaphysicians including 
Parsons (2003), Markosian (1998), and Simons (2004) have endorsed the possibility of 
spatially extended mereological simples. 
 There are mainly two viable conceptions of extended simples. First, there is the 
conception of extended simples as “spanners,” as discussed in Lewis (1991) and McDaniel 
(2007). According to this conception, “an extended simple bears the occupation relation to 
exactly one extended spatiotemporal region, without bearing the location relation to any 
proper part of that extended region” (McDaniel 2007). This definition implies that extended 
  
simples are simples in virtue of covering a part-less region with homogeneous properties, and 
precludes the possibility of extended simples occupying more than a single extended region 
of spacetime. 
 Second, there is the conception of extended simples as “entended” or “multi-located” 
objects, defended in Parsons (2003)—this is the definition I will concentrate on. Parsons 
provides an account of extended simples with a concept he calls “entension,” or “the 
phenomenon of a material object being wholly located in multiple places.” He places this in 
contrast with “pertension,” the phenomenon of an object “being partly located in multiple 
places.” The temporal analogues to such location relations are endurance and perdurance, 
respectively, where endurance is the phenomenon of an object being wholly located at every 
instance of time at which it exists, and perdurance is the phenomenon of an object being 
partly located at every instance of time at which it exists. These entended objects, which I 
will call extended simples from here on for unity of terminology, need not have 
homogeneous properties; rather, they possess intrinsic, non-relational properties that can be 
described as the distribution of original qualities such as “heat” or “polka-dottedness.” When, 
for example, a single object is bright in one region and dark in another, it is the intensity of 
the “darkness” property that varies, and not the object itself. This possibility of a single 
simple having seemingly diverse properties will later prove useful in our discussion of 
quantum holism, where I will argue for the possibility of a single, extended simple 
manifesting itself as multiple material particles. 
 Markosian also contemplates a similar hypothesis of parthood and provides a more 
formal definition for the ESP. Under what he calls the Maximally Continuous View of 
Simples (MaxCon), an object is a simple iff it is maximally continuous — a maximally 
continuous object x being a “spatially continuous object with no continuous region of space 
R, such that the region occupied by x is a proper subset of R and every point in R falls within 
  
some object or another” (Markosian 1998). In other words, when there is a simple that 
extends across a certain continuous spacetime region R, all the points in the said region fall 
within the simple. I find this definition advantageous and will adopt it in the following 
discussions of extended simples, in that it opens the possibility for a simple to be 1) larger 
than a point spanning a single region of spacetime and 2) physically and metaphysically 
divisible. I think any definition of simples that does not permit variations in size or 
divisibility is unremarkable in the world of physics, as simples would be no different from the 
existing, rather outdated notion of indivisible atoms. 
 Having designated a formal definition of the ESP, I now defend the ontology’s 
practical applications by examining its utility in modern physics. 
 
1.1 Superposition 
 
 
Figure 1: Superposition illustrated 
 Consider the familiar quantum setup (Figure 1) in which a “white” particle is placed 
in a hardness box with two apertures, hard and soft. The hardness and softness paths 
  
stemming from the apertures reconvene at some point, and the color of the particle is 
measured again. Experimental results confirm that the particle will always emerge from the 
white aperture, 100% of the time. However, when one places a wall in the softness path such 
that the particle can no longer traverse that path, the resulting probabilities change: the 
particle is measured white 50% of the time, and black the other 50%. This phenomenon in 
which the modification of one path seemingly influences another infinitely distant path and 
the experimental setup itself is dubbed “superposition,” and though it is accepted as a 
fundamental principle of quantum mechanics, it still requires a philosophical explanation. 
 Parsons suggests that granted the orthodox von Neumann strategy, the particle’s state 
of superposition can be attributed to either pertension or the ESP; that is, the particle may 
either be split into multiple parts that separately traverse the two paths, or be wholly located 
in both paths (Parsons 2003). He contends that the former account is more problematic for 
two reasons. First, the pertension hypothesis entails a single particle being split into two 
“half-particles,” each of which travels down a single path. This poses a difficulty to the entire 
quantum setup, as it modifies the physical characteristics of the particle including its mass, 
charge, and spin, affecting its behavior and trajectory. 
Second, the pertension hypothesis exaggerates the non-locality problem, and modifies 
the setup beyond our explanatory capabilities. Prior to the moment of collapse, all 
occurrences are deterministic and are governed by the dynamical equations of quantum 
mechanics, but the instant a single half-particle influences its respective detector instead of 
the other, an indeterministic choice is made. The ESP seems to satisfactorily alleviate these 
concerns, and adheres better to our existing knowledge of physics. Under the ESP, the whole 
particle (an extended simple) traverses both the hard path and the soft path, but only 
influences one of the detectors to collapse the state of superposition. Put simply, a particle 
would be considered a single, wholly located particle, rather than a fusion of two half-
  
particles. Simons (2004) presents a similar argument for the ESP, stating that the moment the 
particle exits the first hardness box in Figure 1, the particle adopts “a new and furcate locus 
and the energies of the two legs sum to the total.” Though this account may be inadequate in 
terms of its predictive capacity, in that it fails to clarify how, probabilistically speaking, the 
particle decides to influence one detector over another, it is still a more competent 
explanation than the pertension hypothesis, because it allows an object to cover disjointed 
regions of spacetime while still retaining its non-homogeneous or uncertain properties. 
 
1.2 Entanglement 
 Quantum setups involving multiple particles, observers, or apparatuses require 
formalisms of entangled states, in which measurements carried out on a single particle inform 
the observer about the properties of other particles within the same system. In addition to 
superposition, entanglement is another quantum phenomenon that extended simples can 
usefully account for. 
 First, for ease of illustration, consider Bohm’s formulation of the well-known EPR 
experiment (Einstein et al. 1935; Bohm 1951). In the experimental setup, two photons, Alice 
and Bob, propagate to the left and right of the z-axis, respectively. The photons are paired in a 
rotationally symmetric state such that if Alice, propagating to the left, is observed to be in one 
of two orthogonal polarization states x or y, then Bob, propagating to the right, is also 
observed to be in the same polarization state as Alice. In other words, they are entangled, and 
their correlated polarization states are always identical. Mathematically, the state vector of 
this setup can be written as follows: 
 
  
  
This illustrates a superposition of the two states in which i) Alice is x-polarized and 
Bob is x-polarized, and ii) Alice is y-polarized and Bob is y-polarized. When Alice and Bob 
are put side by side at the center of the system and are fired to their respective polarization 
filters at either end of the apparatus, the state of superposition given by the above equation 
dictates the following probabilities: 
 
Pr(Alice is observed to be x-polarized & Bob is observed to be y-polarized) = 0 
Pr(Alice is observed to be x-polarized & Bob is observed to be x-polarized) = 0.5 
Pr(Alice is observed to be y-polarized & Bob is observed to be x-polarized) = 0 
Pr(Alice is observed to be y-polarized & Bob is observed to be y-polarized) = 0.5 
 
From the perspective of the observer, who observes the polarization state of Alice at the left 
end of the apparatus, these probabilities are counterintuitive; prior to communicating with 
another observer who observes the polarization of Bob from the left end, she would think that 
the photons are polarized randomly, such that they generate a random binary sequence of x-
polarization and y-polarization outcomes. Due to entanglement and its consequent 
coordination of randomness, however, the two observers will find that their observations are 
always identical, and that the determination of the polarization state of one photon will 
eliminate the uncertainty associated with that of the other photon. That is, the moment Alice 
reaches its observer, the measurement of its polarization automatically and instantaneously 
informs Bob’s observer of Bob’s polarization state, regardless of how far apart the two 
observers are. As with our case study in superposition in Sect. 1.1, entanglement also gives 
rise to “spooky action at a distance,” or non-locality, for which physics cannot account. 
 Interpreting entanglement under the ESP may effectively address the concerns of non-
locality. Recall that following Parsons from Sect. 1.1, the ESP is willing to accommodate 
  
non-homogeneous properties, and considers the diverse characteristics of an object to be 
manifestations of variations of a single property. In the specific case of entanglement, one 
could view the entire system of two particles as an extended simple, and consider Alice to be 
the x-polarized manifestation of the property “polarization,” and Bob to be the y-polarized 
manifestation of it. 
 I think this perspective removes the need for explanations involving non-local 
behavior, elucidating the bizarrely coordinated randomness we call entanglement. To 
motivate this view, we can look to the strong correlation between the two photons that gives 
us good reason to believe that they are extended elements of a single object. If the basic 
characteristics of an object are governed by its underlying relationship with another object, it 
invites the question of whether the two objects are separate to begin with, particularly given 
that conceiving them as separate obliges us to resort to non-local accounts. Much like 
Parsons’s entension hypothesis applied to superposition, extended simples help account for 
entanglement by treating it as a relationship between two components of the same simple, as 
opposed to two entirely different entities. Considering a multiple-particle system as one 
object effectively eliminates any “spooky action at a distance”; one particle no longer 
influences another particle a thousand kilometers away, but instead influences a spatially 
disparate part of itself. Indeed, it is easy, even in the non-quantum context, to imagine one 
region of an object informing the observer about another region of the same object. For 
example, given a single object called the Earth (which I designate as a simple), the 
knowledge that Part A of the Earth is dark immediately informs to us that Part B on the 
opposite side of the Earth is currently bright. The situation of entanglement is similar, in that 
the knowledge about one portion of the system—say, Alice—tells us about the other portion 
of it, Bob. Thus, conceiving of a multiple-particle apparatus as a single body under the ESP 
  
provides an alternative explanation for non-locality that is certainly more intelligible and less 
costly than accounts that resort to non-local interactions. 
 
2. Supersubstantivalism 
2.1 Motivating supersubstantivalism 
 The Newtonian theory of substantivalism and the Leibnizian theory of relationalism 
have maintained a long-standing rivalry on the issue of how to interpret the relationship 
between material objects and spacetime—and on whether spacetime exists at all. 
Relationalism, an ontology that defines and locates objects solely based on their relations 
with other objects, presents a different take on location than substantivalism, an ontology that 
involves material objects as well as the spacetime manifold upon which the objects are 
pinned. 
 Following a relationalist perspective (an ontology of material bodies and the relations 
grouping them together), our traditional conception of spacetime becomes merely a means of 
expressing the spatiotemporal relations between objects. Locating an object, therefore, is not 
an act of pinpointing where the object is situated on a larger expanse of spacetime, but rather 
an act of describing the position of that object in relation to other objects. Put geometrically, 
the concept of “coordinates” cannot assume the existence of a background xyz-vector space; 
coordinates would more appropriately be interpreted as an object’s distance from another 
object located, for instance, 100 meters away. 
 Relationalism is clearly a parsimonious ontology with some pre-theoretical appeal, as 
it reduces the universe to a group of material objects and removes spacetime as a necessary 
component. Consequently, however, it may also place more rigid restrictions on its modal 
properties compared to an ontology that includes an underlying geometrical structure of 
spacetime. Following the verificationist criterion of Leibniz’s principle of the identity of 
  
indiscernibles, the relationalist would argue that there is no difference between World A and 
World B in which all material bodies in World A were moved five meters to the right, as the 
spatiotemporal relations between the bodies remain the same. Thus, for the relationalist, the 
set of modal properties of objects are limited to their particular relations in a given world, and 
exclude the possible configurations of objects in Euclidean space. Relationalists may not find 
this problematic—such conceptual possibilities could merely be counterfactual situations that 
are not reflective of the actual structure of the world—but it is yet unclear how undesirable 
relationalism’s account of possibilities is. 
 In contrast to relationalism, substantivalism “pins” objects onto a single spacetime 
fabric. One of the core commitments of substantivalism is that spacetime is a fundamental 
constituent of reality, and that there is an “occupation relation” by which material bodies 
occupy certain regions of spacetime. This has traditionally been accepted as the most 
scientifically sound ontology, due to its treatment of spacetime as a series of unextended 
points and its compatibility with Minkowski spacetime (Walker-Dale 2013). Substantivalism 
has also been considered useful for developments in quantum field theory as physicists 
experiment with traditional Minkowski space quantum field theory (QFT) as well as QFT in 
curved-spacetime, both of which treat space and time as entities in their own right. 
 But despite substantivalism’s snug fit into our conventional (and perhaps future) 
notions of physics, the theory certainly has ontological limitations as well. For one, the 
inevitable “occupation relation” forces us to adopt mysterious connections between objects 
and space that are explicable only by coincidence. The fact that all material bodies require 
spacetime in order to be instantiated, or that bodies are perfectly harmonious with the 
spacetime regions that underpin them, provides mounting evidence that there is some sort of 
relationship between objects and spacetime. In order to justify this relation, substantivalism 
has to invent a brute, gratuitous interdependence between objects and space. 
  
 A more recently suggested middle ground between relationalism and substantivalism 
is supersubstantivalism (SS), which argues for a monistic ontology that identifies objects as 
parts of spacetime itself. While this theory inherits the concept of a spacetime manifold from 
substantivalism, it is akin to relationalism in that it posits the monistic hypothesis that 
material objects are part of, or even equivalent to, their corresponding spacetime regions. It is 
an ontology that parsimoniously explains all that we want material objects and spacetime to 
account for. 
 Schaffer, a notable proponent of SS, provides several arguments illustrating SS’s 
superior explanatory capabilities (Schaffer 2009). Besides its ontological parsimony, SS also 
offers a straightforward explanation for the perfect harmony between the geometrical and 
mereological properties of objects and those of spacetime regions (an area in which 
substantivalism is lacking). More broadly, in describing the interface between spacetime and 
objects, the supersubstantivalist would leave a lot less room for coincidence than the 
substantivalist, who explains phenomena such as the monopolization of spacetime and the 
materialization of objects through coincidence or the occupation relation. I believe these are 
good reasons to prefer SS over relationalism or dualistic substantivalism. 
 
2.2 Supersubstantivalism in Quantum Field Theory 
 Beyond escaping the troubling occupation relation, SS is also a preferable ontology in 
discussing quantum field theory (QFT), a physical framework that strongly suggests the 
existence of “fields” of spacetime and the absence of material bodies. 
 Fields have proven essential in accounting for the electromagnetic characteristics of 
objects, and have helped resolve the limitations of the formalism of quantum mechanics. The 
property of having discrete and quantized physical quantities, considered uniquely applicable 
  
to particles, were transferred to fields. Fields would be considered packets of energy subject 
to granularity and quantum probability, rather than continuous electromagnetic fields. 
 More specifically, QFT treats particles as excitations of their underlying physical 
field, and dub them “field quanta.” The energy of these quanta are directly related to the 
frequency of the field surrounding them, and such differences in energy potentials between 
particles in turn form the field, indicating an interdependence between the two substances. As 
Weinberg suggests, “A quantum field theory is a theory in which the fundamental ingredients 
are fields rather than particles; the particles are little bundles of energy in the field” (quoted in 
Schaffer 2009). Following this definition, if we identify fields as space, and particles as mere 
excitations of the fields around them, the substance dualist (the substantivalist) would be 
misinterpreting the nature of spacetime. Fields would be the only real substance, and the 
supposed “matter” we see would be created and destroyed by the fields themselves. It follows 
naturally that a monistic ontology such as SS would be more appropriate for QFT. Indeed, 
Schaffer claims that by adopting a monistic supersubstantivalist framework, “fundamental 
physics does not need to explain why, for instance, the geometrical properties of material 
objects are a perfect fit for the geometrical properties of the spacetime regions they 
occupy…. There is the spatiotemporal manifold, and the fundamental properties are pinned 
directly to it. Nothing more.” Earman further affirms that “modern field theory is not 
implausibly read as saying the physical world is fully described by giving the values of 
various fields, whether scalar, vector, or tensor, which fields are attributes of the spacetime 
manifold M” (Earman 1989). As such, if all matter is reducible to spacetime, and the concept 
of particles is interchangeable with excitations in fields, a substantivalist model hardly seems 
worthwhile, and QFT seems suggestive of a monistic, supersubstantivalist ontology of 
spacetime. 
 
  
2.3 ESP in Quantum Field Theory 
 The plausibility of the supersubstantivalist interpretation of QFT may prompt us to 
reconsider QFT in the context of the extended simples picture that I endorsed in Sect. 1. I 
have argued that SS is useful for explaining the fact that material objects (particles) and 
spacetime (fields) are inextricably tied such that particles are brought into existence by 
excitations of fields, and that differences in the energy potentials of particles determine the 
properties of their surrounding field. It seems appropriate, then, to hypothesize that objects 
and spacetime are elements of one, extended simple called the universe, whose spacetime 
component influences and creates its object component (much like the way Alice influences 
Bob in the example of entanglement). 
 This view is compelling given the MaxCon definition of extended simples that I 
adopted, which states that when there is a simple that is said to be extended across a certain 
continuous spacetime region R, all the points in the said region fall within the simple. Based 
on this definition, if we let the region R be the area encompassing the field, and the “points in 
the said region” be the particles that the field gives rise to, we can define an extended simple 
consisting of the field and its particles. This allows the particles to not only “fall within the 
simple,” but also to be causally coupled with their underlying field, in accordance with the 
supersubstantivalist view of QFT. 
 
3. Reconciling ESP with SS: Quantum holism 
3.1 Arguments for the Incompatibility of ESP and SS 
 There is a smooth congruence of extended simples and supersubstantivalism in QFT, 
but the two theories are nonetheless traditionally considered incompatible, or at least have not 
been fused together as a singular ontology. In this section, I examine some popular objections 
  
to the compatibility of ESP and SS before presenting quantum holism as a framework to 
reconcile the two ontologies. 
 In arguing for the supersubstantivalist view, Schaffer dismisses extended simples, 
calling it an “exotic possibility” and going as far as to state, “I think extended simples are 
impossible, or at least, given unrestricted decomposition, the impossibility of extended 
simples is immediate.” This objection is grounded in the premise that SS presumes the 
possibility of “unrestricted composition and decomposition,” which treats “gerrymandered 
and discontinuous regions all the same” and posits that “for any plurality of spacetime 
regions, there is a region that fuses them” and that “for any extended spacetime region, there 
are sub-regions that fission it” (Schaffer 2009). This is an understandable concern, since the 
act of fusing multiple spacetime regions or fissioning an extended region implies the 
existence of divisible parts, which is, prima facie, impermissible per the definition of an 
extended simple. 
 Such an objection is reminiscent of the “conceptual parts” objection that Parsons 
responds to in his discussion of the entension hypothesis, which argues that extended objects 
must have parts if we are “able to conceive of those parts separately, even if the parts 
themselves are inseparable” (Parsons 2003). Essentially, the objection draws on the 
distinction between physical parts and conceptual parts, and contends that even if objects are 
not physically divisible, they may be conceptually divisible, which sufficiently renders them 
complex objects rather than extended simples. Markosian (1998) seems to accept this 
distinction, admitting that “it is apparent that anything with some extension will have 
conceptual parts, even if it doesn’t have metaphysical parts.” While this fortunately does not 
contradict his MaxCon definition of extended simples, I agree with Parsons that the 
conceptual parts distinction is unnecessary, and can be overcome using the concept of 
intrinsic, non-relational properties discussed in Sect. 1. That is, if we consider conceptually 
  
distinguishable properties to be variations of a single quality, we have no reason to believe 
that conceptually separate parts comprise different objects. Parsons illustrates, “I can 
intelligibly say “I am looking at the morning star and not at the evening star” — but this 
doesn’t show that the morning star and evening star are not identical, or that they must be 
distinct parts (temporal parts perhaps) of Venus” (Parsons 2003). He may respond to 
Schaffer’s concern by undermining the necessity (but not necessarily the feasibility) of fusing 
or disassembling spacetime regions, and stating that despite the conceptual separability of 
regions, extended objects can still be simples. 
 Admittedly, however, Parsons’ answer to the conceptual parts objection is inadequate, 
because the principle of unrestricted composition and decomposition does not always reside 
in the conceptual realm, and may well be about the actual physical separation of objects. I 
believe that this objection requires adopting the quantum holism framework, which causally 
interweaves all objects in the universe into one extended simple. 
 
3.2 Quantum holism: Unifying the ESP and SS 
 Quantum holism is a theory motivated by the necessity to provide a common ground 
explanation for quantum phenomena. Ismael and Schaffer (2016) expand on Hume’s 
inference that “if entities a and b are necessarily connected, then a and b are not distinct 
existences,” and suggests that we accept a “Source Inference” principle, which states “If non-
identical entities a and b are modally connected, then either (i) a grounds b, or (ii) b grounds 
a, or (iii) a and b are joint results of some common ground c.” In other words, if two entities 
are modally connected, there must be some sort of causal connection between the entities, or 
a common cause that results in both of them. Common ground explanations, which ground 
parts in wholes to inductively identify common partial grounds for objects that exhibit modal 
connections, can be essential in our search for the most basic units of nature. 
  
 One can identify the need for a source inference (or common ground) explanation in 
the quantum phenomenon of entanglement. Revisiting the EPR setup I used to justify the 
ESP, particles in a system may be jointly constrained by certain probabilities so that it is 
possible to predict the properties of one particle given information about those of the other. 
Science and philosophy are faced with a roadblock when trying to provide a physical 
explanation for how entanglement occurs, or how particles that may be lightyears away from 
each other exhibit such coordinated randomness. We have identified three distinct theories 
that could supply this explanation: non-locality, the EPR “hidden variables” theory, and 
nonseparability. The first two theories, however, are conventionally considered implausible. 
First,  non-locality, which assumes the presence of instantaneous, superluminal causation, 
directly belies special relativity’s principle of locality—a conflict we have not yet resolved. 
Second, the hidden variables theory, which postulates that quantum mechanics is incomplete 
and that there must be intrinsic states encoded in the particles’ quantum state descriptions, 
has been demonstrated through multiple empirical experiments to be an implausible 
explanation (Aspect 1982, Freedman 1972). The final explanation, nonseparability, is the 
idea that the two particles share a modal connection that provides us more information about 
Alice and Bob than can be found in them individually: the system of the two particles 
amounts to more than the sum of its parts. Nonseparability seems to be the best explanation 
for entanglement, and the most accurate characterization of particle behavior according to 
quantum mechanics. If we dismiss nonseparability and regard the Alice + Bob system as 
being grounded in its individual components rather than in a holistic modal connection, we 
can only describe the individual features of Alice and Bob and leave unexplained their mutual 
dependence governed by coordinated randomness. Indeed, nonseparability, in which wholes 
ground parts (i.e. the principle that if Alice has x-polarization, then Bob also has x-
polarization, and if Alice has y-polarization, Bob also has y-polarization), seems to be the 
  
only explanation that can fully save the phenomenon of entanglement. From here, we can 
extract a theory of quantum holism: “in a nonseparable quantum system, non-identical events 
a and b are modally connected” (Ismael & Schaffer 2016). 
 I will not be discussing the specific ontologies that the relevant literature considers to 
treat spacetime as a whole, but it is important to note that broadly, quantum holism views the 
components of entangled systems as shared manifestations of a common ground, and 
suggests that the entire universe might be a single entangled entity. This argument is based on 
two observations: first, entangled states are mathematically generic, meaning that if there is a 
wave function governing the cosmos, it is entangled. Second, given that there would have 
been entanglement created at the initial expansion of the universe, and that the evolution of 
Schrödinger’s equation preserves entanglement, “every particle in the universe must become 
entangled with every other” (Penrose 2004). The quantum holism hypothesis, which usefully 
elucidates entanglement, can accommodate both extended simples and SS as fundamental 
ontologies. 
 First, it is evident in the formulation of quantum holism that all material objects are 
intertwined via a common ground state of entanglement. Put differently, if we are to ground 
parts through wholes, all material objects should be treated as components of one, entangled 
object that encompasses the whole material cosmos. Furthermore, because pertension is not a 
viable hypothesis in situations of entanglement following Sect. 1.2, this massive object must 
be an extended simple composed of multiple particles, rather than an object including several 
pertended particles. I should clarify that in this context, the term “extended simple” is not 
used in its typical mereological or geometrical sense of being physically extended across a 
spacetime region, but is used in a causal sense of being tied together by a single, causal 
explanation. Such a causal formulation of extended simples is equally useful as physically 
extended simples, in that the purpose of adopting the ESP in physics mainly comes from its 
  
capacity to account for coordinated, mysterious interactions (such as superposition or 
entanglement) between supposedly non-identical objects. Acknowledging a common causal 
connection between objects sufficiently achieves this purpose, since the causal explanation 
allows particles to influence one another outside of the constraints of locality, akin to the way 
particles influence each other as parts of a physical extended simple. An object thus has to 
satisfy two conditions to be considered an extended simple: all components of the object must 
be causally interconnected, and should not exhibit causal connection with any other object. 
We can repurpose Markosian’s MaxCon view of extended simples and arrive at the following 
definition: 
x is a maximally continuous object iff x is a causally connected object with 
no continuous region of space, R, such that (i) the region occupied by x is 
causally grounded in R and (ii) every point in R is modally connected to 
another object that is not x. 
Necessarily, x is a simple iff x is a maximally continuous object. 
 
 Using this definition, we are finally able to reconcile the ESP with SS. Recalling Sect. 
3.1, I think the possibility of causal, holistic extended simples provides an effective response 
to Schaffer’s objection against incorporating extended simples into the supersubstantivalist 
ontology. Since quantum holism characterizes the entire cosmos as being interwoven by 
entanglement, “unrestricted composition or decomposition” would not affect the object’s 
scope in any significant way. Even if one were to synthetically combine or separate objects, 
the extended simple can still be preserved, since the state of entanglement that grounds them 
cannot be modified or removed and the objects would retain a causal connection. Hence, 
under a quantum holism model, neither the conceptual nor the physical separability of objects 
can be a reason to reject the possibility of extended simples. 
 This is not to say, however, that it is pointless or impossible to consider objects in a 
causally separable light. In fact, from a macroscopic frame of reference, thinking of all 
  
objects as part of an expansive extended simple might strain the definition of causation and 
overcomplicate the relations between objects. For instance, there would be no value in saying 
that a barometer and my hair are an extended simple originating from a common ground 
simply because the wind can cause both of them to move. If we were to conceive of material 
bodies in this way, perhaps all objects would exhibit causal connections in one way or 
another, in which case the definition of causation would become too broad and the causal ties 
would not be useful for tracing back to a single common ground. Thus, what I am proposing 
is not the renunciation of all distinctions between objects, but rather a shift in perspective 
when considering the most fundamental units of spacetime on a quantum scale. Embracing a 
holistic, causally extended model of material particles and integrating it with the underlying 
spacetime through a supersubstantivalist framework is not only parsimonious, but can also 
have practical consequences in our understanding of quantum phenomena such as 
entanglement and quantum field theory. 
 Once we accept the ESP as a viable way of understanding spacetime, we can notice 
the straightforward compatibility between the ESP and SS; SS, which claims that spacetime 
and matter are one substance, can be aided by the ESP, which unifies all material objects—
specifically those on an atomic or subatomic level—into one extended simple. I offer two 
arguments in support of adopting this combined ontology. 
1. Parsimony 
 Thus far, I have considered three hypotheses to characterize the interface between 
spacetime and materials: the hypothesis that all material objects (i.e. particles) are separate 
entities, each with its own properties independent from those of other objects; the pertension 
hypothesis, which states that one object has multiple parts that are located in spatially 
disparate regions of spacetime; and the extended simples hypothesis, which states that one 
object is wholly located, or extended, in numerous spacetime regions and is not conceptually 
  
separable. The first theory takes the arrangement of material objects at face value, using 
distinctive properties and spacetime locations to define separate objects. It is clearly less 
parsimonious than the second and third theories, as it assumes the existence of more objects 
without adding explanatory value, does not account for entanglement, and resorts to brute 
connections between objects in place of nonseparable grounds. 
 Then in comparing the entension and pertension hypotheses, one should assess the 
need for substances to be complex rather than extended, as well as the role of separable parts. 
The primary role of physically and conceptually separable parts is to account for the varying 
properties that objects exhibit. Diverse properties, however, are not an adequate warrant to 
adopt the pertension hypothesis; the entension hypothesis supports the same phenomenon 
using distributional properties that vary in intensity. It is unnecessary to concoct boundaries 
between parts. Combining this picture with SS, we end up with a model that unites all 
material bodies by considering them entended and by equating them to spacetime. This is a 
maximally parsimonious theory of spacetime, as it explains the interface between material 
objects and their underlying spacetime field while still maintaining a monistic ontology. 
2. Quantum field theory 
 QFT is already a good reason to adopt supersubstantivalism, as it theorizes that 
particles are reducible to field excitations. Why then, could a common ground explanation 
that integrates supersubstantivalism with ESP be beneficial for our understanding of QFT? 
 Consider an electron moving through its electromagnetic field. Its movement causes a 
disturbance in the electromagnetic field, and as a corollary, disturbs nearby electrons as well. 
Heathcote writes, “Since the disturbance is a form of energy it must be quantized, and given 
that this is what is referred to as a long range force it can be deduced that the quantized 
disturbance of the electromagnetic field is a zero mass particle, namely the photon. Photons 
therefore are the means by which electrically charged particles interact” (Heathcote 1989). 
  
With this proposition in mind, we can picture spacetime as consisting of fields that constantly 
simmer with ephemeral photons, or “virtual particles” that exchange disturbances with other 
particles. These virtual particles that emerge from disturbances caused by particles, act as 
forces between objects and can account for all causal influences, indicating that particles 
originating from the field are fundamentally connected in a causal fashion. Intuitively, this 
common ground justifies not only the supersubstantivalist view that matter is equivalent to 
spacetime, but also the extended simples view that particles share a causal connection as 
components of an all-encompassing simple. 
 Thus, far from being an exotic possibility, the ESP complements SS, and is a helpful 
model in explaining quantum phenomena such as entanglement and superposition, as well as 
quantum field theory. 
 As an overall summary, I have attempted to defend both the extended simples picture 
and the supersubstantivalist framework by means of case studies in modern physics, and have 
suggested that contrary to popular belief, the two ontologies complement each other. I have 
proposed thinking of extended simples in a causal sense based on the theory of quantum 
holism, and have rationalised a plausible fusion between the ESP and SS. I believe that this 
new, synthesised ontology may help shed light on new developments in physics, and in 
particular, mysterious quantum phenomena.  
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